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TO REPUDIATE OR MERELY CURTAIL?
JUSTICE GORSUCH AND CHEVRON DEFERENCE
Kristin E. Hickman*
The Chevron doctrine has dominated conversations about administrative
law for thirty-five years. Most people reading this Essay probably know more
or less by heart the basic doctrinal points of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.1 and its progeny. Decided in 1984, Chevron is best
known for its two-part test for evaluating agency interpretations of statutes,
asking first whether the meaning of the statute is clear or ambiguous, and if
the latter, then asking second whether the agency’s interpretation thereof is
permissible.2 Through this test, Chevron counsels that courts must defer to
permissible agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. Chevron also was notable for its recognition that some congressional delegations are implied
through statutory ambiguity rather than explicit.3 And since the Supreme
Court decided United States v. Mead Corp.4 in 2001, everyone knows that agency
interpretations of statutes are eligible for Chevron deference only when Congress delegates to the agency the authority to act with the force and effect of
law and when the agency interpretation in question reflects an exercise of that
power.5 Otherwise, the agency’s interpretation should be evaluated—and perhaps given less deference—based upon the presence or absence of contextual
factors of the alternative Skidmore standard.6
Beyond those basic pronouncements—and maybe even including them—
doctrinal agreement about Chevron more or less ends. Disagreement and debate abound over just how to describe or ascertain statutory ambiguity, how
to define and evaluate the presence or absence of congressional delegations,

* Distinguished McKnight University Professor and Harlan Albert Rogers Professor in Law, University of Minnesota Law School. Thanks to participants in the symposium for which this Essay was written, as well as Mark Thomson and Aaron Nielson, for helpful comments, conversations, questions, and
suggestions, and thanks to Paul Dimick for research assistance.
1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. Id. at 842–43.
3. Id. at 844 (“Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit
rather than explicit.”).
4. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
5. See id. at 226–27.
6. See id. at 227; see also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (calling upon courts to
give “weight” to an agency’s interpretation of a statute based upon factors such as thoroughness, validity,
and consistency).
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and which agency formats carry the legal force required for Chevron deference.
As a result, Chevron means different things to different people, and substantial
leeway exists for either narrowing or expanding the scope of Chevron deference.7
The late Justice Antonin Scalia was as responsible as anyone for Chevron’s
rise to prominence. He promoted it staunchly first as a judge on the United
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and later as a Justice on the United States Supreme Court.8 Later, Justice Scalia railed against his colleagues’ efforts to shape the scope of Chevron’s applicability.9 Paradoxically, in his last
years on the Court, as some of his colleagues began to openly question Chevron’s premises, rather than offering a robust defense of the doctrine he previously had embraced so fully, Justice Scalia acknowledged that Chevron might be
inconsistent with the text of the Administrative Procedure Act, even if it “at
least was in conformity with the long history of judicial review of executive
action.”10
Justice Scalia’s successor, Justice Neil Gorsuch, is regarded as one of Chevron’s most ardent foes.11 As a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit, in Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch,12 Justice Gorsuch challenged
the Chevron doctrine’s premises, contended that Chevron deference conflicts
with separation of powers principles, and at least strongly hinted that the Supreme Court should repudiate Chevron.13 Since joining the Court himself, Justice Gorsuch has continued to attack Chevron. Responding to the Court’s denial of certiorari in Scenic America, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, Justice
Gorsuch called upon the Court to resolve a circuit split regarding whether an
agency’s interpretation of ambiguous contractual terms should be Chevroneligible.14 More commentary ensued regarding Justice Gorsuch’s dislike of
Chevron.15 From these and other writings and statements by Justice Gorsuch
7. See Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1392, 1418–41 (2017) (illustrating this point).
8. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 838 (2001).
9. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1005 (2005)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S.
576, 589 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
10. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1212 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
11. See, e.g., Niki Ford, Tax Reform in a “World Without Chevron”: Will Tax Regulations Withstand the
Review of Justice Gorsuch?, 71 TAX LAW. 975, 996–99 (2018); Richard W. Murphy, Abandon Chevron and Modernize Stare Decisis for the Administrative State, 69 ALA. L. REV. 1, 39 & n.236 (2017); Jamelle C. Sharpe, Delegation and Its Discontents, 64 WAYNE L. REV. 185, 191–203 (2018); Jonathan R. Siegel, The Constitutional Case for
Chevron Deference, 71 VAND. L. REV. 937, 950–51 (2018).
12. 834 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 2016).
13. Id. at 1151–55 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
14. Scenic Am., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 138 S. Ct. 2, 2–3 (2017) (mem.) (Gorsuch, J., respecting the
denial of certiorari).
15. See, e.g., Heather Elliott, Justice Gorsuch’s Would-Be War on Chevron, 21 GREEN BAG 2D 315
(2018).

HICKMANFINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

736

4/2/2019 2:42 PM

ALABAMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:3:733

regarding Chevron deference, Court watchers and scholars generally consider
him a solid vote on the Court for overturning the Chevron standard altogether.
But what does that really mean?
Some Chevron critics are opposed merely to certain aspects of Chevron
analysis, like the potential for judges simply to declare a complicated statute
“ambiguous” and defer when meaning is not immediately apparent, rather
than make a greater effort to resolve statutory meaning using traditional tools
of statutory interpretation. Other Chevron critics acknowledge that judicial deference might be warranted for some subset of agency legal interpretations but
prefer Skidmore’s contextual factors16 or perhaps some other standard that
would function differently17 or might be less deferential.18 In any of these scenarios, deference remains a possibility; only the circumstances and conditions
of deference change.
Still other Chevron critics seek to do away with judicial deference altogether
and have judges resolve all questions of statutory meaning using traditional
tools of statutory construction. Nicholas Bednar and I have argued that efforts to do away with judicial deference altogether are doomed and that courts
will continue to defer to agency legal interpretations (whether under the Chevron label or otherwise) so long as Congress continues to delegate broad policymaking discretion to agencies.19 Chevron is merely a standard of review that
provides judges with a common language and framework for explaining judicial decision-making.20 This conclusion does not mean, however, that Chevron
deference cannot be cabined, perhaps even more substantially than more recent jurisprudence has already.
Where in the spectrum of Chevron critics does Justice Gorsuch fall? Only
he knows for sure. Justice Gorsuch will never be a Chevron enthusiast. He
clearly favors a robust and independent judicial inquiry into statutory meaning
and casts a skeptical eye toward applying the Chevron standard at all in many
contexts. He does and undoubtedly will continue to whittle away at Chevron
deference by applying traditional tools of statutory interpretation to find statutory clarity more readily than some of his colleagues and by pushing the Court
to impose additional limitations on Chevron’s applicability. He may feel less

16. For example, Justice Breyer is an advocate of a very Skidmore-like version of the Chevron standard.
See Kristin E. Hickman, The Three Phases of Mead, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 527, 541–45 (2014) (describing Justice Breyer’s Skidmore-esque conception of Chevron).
17. See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2121, 2144–45
(2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)).
18. The Skidmore standard is generally thought to be less deferential than the Chevron standard, both
conceptually and empirically, but some courts and scholars have expressed doubts as to whether that is the
case. See generally David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135 (2010) (surveying and synthesizing
perspectives and empirical studies regarding the degree of deference afforded by different standards of judicial review in the administrative law context).
19. See Bednar & Hickman, supra note 7, at 1453–56 (making this argument).
20. See id. (making this point).
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constrained by stare decisis than some of his colleagues, although his tenure
on the Supreme Court is too brief at present to say so with any certainty.21 He
may well be part of an eventual Court majority that votes to overturn Chevron’s
two-step standard. Nevertheless, evidence exists suggesting that Justice Gorsuch’s harsh statements about Chevron were influenced by the particular mix of
Tenth Circuit cases in which he participated. By comparison, the Supreme
Court, at least historically, has applied the Chevron standard in a qualitatively
different set of cases that, should the pattern hold, Justice Gorsuch may find
less objectionable. Also, it is doubtful that Justice Gorsuch is so naive as to
believe that judges can resolve all statutory questions on their own and need
never defer to agency discretionary choices. For these reasons, even if one assumes (as one probably should) that Justice Gorsuch will continue pushing
the Court to curtail and even repudiate the Chevron standard, it seems unlikely
that Justice Gorsuch will succeed in doing away with judicial deference altogether, or even that he means to try.
I. JUSTICE GORSUCH’S CHEVRON
When a Justice of the Supreme Court has thoroughly lambasted a doctrine, accusing it of “permit[ting] all too easy intrusions on the liberty of the
people” and only grudgingly conceding that it is not quite “the very definition
of tyranny,”22 one would be foolhardy to argue that such a Justice is anything
but an opponent of said doctrine. On the other hand, Justices of the Supreme
Court—Justice Gorsuch included—tend to hold pretty nuanced views of legal
doctrine. For the most part, Justice Gorsuch’s reputation as a Chevron critic is
attributable to his opinions in a handful of cases. Appreciating his pronouncements in those cases requires considering them in the context of his
jurisprudence more broadly, principally at the Tenth Circuit, though also during his short time thus far at the Supreme Court.
A. Negative Pronouncements
Perhaps Justice Gorsuch’s most significant statements regarding the Chevron doctrine come from a pair of immigration cases from his time as a Tenth
Circuit judge: De Niz Robles v. Lynch23 and Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch24—
particularly the latter, though understanding one requires considering the oth21. Cf. Anita S. Krishnakumar, Textualism and Statutory Precedents, 104 VA. L. REV. 157, 162–64, 163
n.18 (2018) (exploring the willingness of textualist Justices to ignore stare decisis in statutory cases but declining to characterize Justice Gorsuch given his limited tenure on the Court).
22. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
23. 803 F.3d 1165, 1167 (10th Cir. 2015).
24. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1143.
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er. In these cases, the Tenth Circuit was called upon to consider a Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality
Act. The Supreme Court has expressly called for using the Chevron standard to
evaluate BIA interpretations of the immigration laws,25 so it is hardly surprising that then-Judge Gorsuch recognized Chevron’s applicability in De Niz Robles
and Gutierrez-Brizuela as well.26 In fact, although he did not acknowledge it in
De Niz Robles, Judge Gorsuch recognized in Gutierrez-Brizuela that the Tenth
Circuit had already deferred under Chevron step two to the BIA interpretation
in question in a third case.27 But the BIA interpretation at stake in all of these
cases was contrary to an even earlier Tenth Circuit precedent, wherein laid the
difficulty.
In National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services,28 the Supreme Court considered the interaction between the Chevron
standard and stare decisis and, in an opinion authored by Justice Thomas,
concluded that the former trumps the latter when statutory meaning is ambiguous.29 In other words, if Congress has delegated, and an administering agency has exercised, the power to interpret a statute with the force of law and the
statute is ambiguous, then a circuit court should defer to the agency’s reasonable interpretation of the statute even when circuit precedent adopts a different interpretation. As Judge Gorsuch recognized in De Niz Robles, “[t]ogether,
then, [Chevron and Brand X] mean that there are indeed some occasions when a
federal bureaucracy can effectively overrule a judicial decision.”30 It was a
conclusion that troubled Justice Scalia greatly in Brand X,31 and it clearly troubles Justice Gorsuch as well.
As with Chevron itself, although Brand X involved a notice-and-comment
regulation, the courts have carried its conclusions to the formal adjudication
context as well, including BIA interpretations. But the circumstances of Brand
X and the BIA cases are very different. The interpretation at issue in Brand X
was communicated in a regulation adopted with public participation to regulate corporate activity on a prospective basis. By comparison, De Niz Robles
and Gutierrez-Brizuela involved individual immigrants who entered the United
States illegally and filed applications to have their immigration status adjusted
based on a favorable Tenth Circuit interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act. In Mr. De Niz Robles’s case, the BIA adopted a different, less-

25. See, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424–25 (1999);
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448–49 (1987).
26. See Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1143; De Niz Robles, 803 F.3d at 1167.
27. See Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1144 (citing Padilla-Caldera v. Holder, 637 F.3d 1140, 1148–52
(10th Cir. 2011)).
28. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
29. Id. at 981–83.
30. De Niz Robles, 803 F.3d at 1167.
31. See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1014–20 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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favorable interpretation of the statute while his application was pending, applied that interpretation to him retroactively, and sought to deport him. Mr.
Gutierrez-Brizuela filed his application after the BIA adopted its own interpretation of the statute but before the Tenth Circuit accepted the BIA’s interpretation as controlling, but the end result was the same.
Like the Tenth Circuit in De Niz Robles and Gutierrez-Brizuela, other circuits have been troubled by and struggled with the interaction of Chevron,
Brand X, and the retroactivity of adjudicative decisionmaking.32 Writing for
the court in De Niz Robles, again, Judge Gorsuch did not question Chevron’s
applicability. Instead, he focused his analysis on mitigating the retroactivity.
“[I]f the separation of powers doesn’t forbid this form of decisionmaking”—
and here he did not suggest otherwise—“might second-order constitutional
protections sounding in due process and equal protection, as embodied in our
longstanding traditions and precedents addressing retroactivity in the law,
sometimes constrain the retroactive application of its results?”33 Judge Gorsuch answered that question with a resounding “yes,”34 rejecting the application of the BIA’s interpretation to Mr. De Niz Robles, even while accepting
prospective application of the same interpretation.
Although the BIA tried to argue that the timing of Mr. GutierrezBrizuela’s application distinguished his case from De Niz Robles,35 Judge Gorsuch disagreed. Writing for the court, he said the key facts were that both status adjustment applications were submitted before the Tenth Circuit recognized the validity of the BIA’s interpretation, and therefore, both Mr. De Niz
Robles and Mr. Gutierrez-Brizuela reasonably relied on the Tenth Circuit’s
contrary precedent that favored their applications.36 The same due process
and equal protection concerns that animated the court’s reasoning in De Niz
Robles applied equally to Mr. Gutierrez-Brizuela, and the outcome with respect
to retroactive application of the BIA’s interpretation should be the same as
well.37
Unlike in De Niz Robles, however, Judge Gorsuch wrote a separate concurring opinion in Gutierrez-Brizuela, in which he took aim squarely at the Chevron standard. At first, his concurring opinion merely questioned Brand X as a
usurpation of the judicial function: “When the political branches disagree with
a judicial interpretation of existing law, the Constitution prescribes the appro-

32. See, e.g., Acosta-Olivarria v. Lynch, 799 F.3d 1271, 1277 (9th Cir. 2015); Velásquez-García v.
Holder, 760 F.3d 571, 578–84 (7th Cir. 2014); Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504, 516 (9th Cir.
2012) (en banc).
33. De Niz Robles, 803 F.3d at 1171–72.
34. Id. at 1172.
35. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1144–45 (10th Cir. 2016).
36. Id. at 1145.
37. Id. at 1146.
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priate remedial process. It’s called legislation.”38 As his concurring opinion
went on, however, Judge Gorsuch challenged the validity of the Chevron standard outright, as inconsistent with the Administrative Procedure Act’s command that the courts should “‘interpret . . . statutory provisions’ and overturn
agency action inconsistent with those interpretations.”39 Ascertaining whether
statutes are ambiguous and agency interpretations are reasonable leaves no
room for courts to “interpret the law and say what it is,” Judge Gorsuch suggested.40 He acknowledged that the Chevron opinion itself was “about permitting agencies to make the law” when Congress leaves a gap for the agency to
fill, rather than “permitting agencies to assume the judicial function of interpreting the law.”41 Yet based on De Niz Robles and Gutierrez-Brizuela, he insisted
that “the problem remains that courts are not fulfilling their duty to interpret
the law and declare invalid agency actions inconsistent with those interpretations in the cases and controversies that come before them.”42 Additionally,
hitting several of the high points in the longstanding discussion about Chevron,
Judge Gorsuch questioned whether legislators intend for courts to disregard
their interpretive role in favor of agencies and whether Congress can delegate
legislative power to agencies in the first place.43 He wondered why the Supreme Court denies Chevron deference to interpretations of criminal statutes
but not statutes with both civil and criminal applications.44 He also suggested
that Chevron does not work very well anyway, given the Mead decision’s murkiness in narrowing Chevron’s scope and ongoing questions about “just how rigorous Chevron step one is supposed to be.”45 And he maintained that “a world
without Chevron,” and with de novo judicial review instead, would work just
fine.46
Justice Gorsuch’s hostility toward Chevron has manifested itself more subtly in other cases as well. Unlike some judges, he has not been shy about employing traditional tools of statutory interpretation to discern statutory meaning and clarity at Chevron step one, thereby avoiding deference.47 In Hydro
Resources, Inc. v. EPA,48 writing for an en banc Tenth Circuit, then-Judge Gorsuch suggested that Chevron review might be inappropriate for an Environ38. Id. at 1151 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
39. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012)).
40. Id. at 1152.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1153.
43. See id.
44. Id. at 1155–57.
45. Id. at 1157.
46. See id. at 1158.
47. See, e.g., Wis. Cent., Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2018); TransAm Trucking, Inc.
v. Admin. Review Bd., 833 F.3d 1206, 1216 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); Elwell v. Oklahoma,
693 F.3d 1303, 1313 (10th Cir. 2012).
48. Hydro Res., Inc. v. EPA, 608 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
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mental Protection Agency (EPA) interpretation regarding the scope of its
permitting authority under the Safe Drinking Water Act. He observed that the
relevant provision was “not a statute specially involving environmental regulation, but one all and only about the geographic parameters of federal and tribal criminal prosecutorial authority,” and thus outside the range of EPA core
expertise.49 Judge Gorsuch avoided resolving the question, however, by contending that the agency’s failure to request deference allowed the court to review the agency’s interpretation de novo. He thus, either inadvertently or deliberately, seemed to favor the anti-Chevron position in an ongoing debate over
whether and under what circumstances agencies can waive Chevron deference.50 More recently, in Scenic America, Inc. v. Department of Transportation,51
now-Justice Gorsuch suggested the Court take up whether an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous contractual term should be Chevron-eligible and described that question in terms suggesting that he would think not.52
Finally, echoing his call in Gutierrez-Brizuela for de novo judicial review,
Justice Gorsuch has not limited his attacks on deference doctrine to Chevron.
In E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Smiley,53 he filed a statement respecting a
denial of certiorari asking the Court to resolve a circuit split over whether
agency interpretations of statutes advanced for the first time in litigation are
worthy of deference under Skidmore, and suggesting they should not be.54
B. Contrary Signals
It is fair to suppose that a particular judge’s perspective on Chevron will be
affected by the specific types of Chevron cases the judge sees. No one can possibly claim to have read, let alone really processed, every case applying Chevron,
let alone every scholarly article or commentary discussing those cases. Scholars and judges possess many competing views regarding how Chevron operates
and when it ought to apply. Meanwhile, many judges may handle only a small
number of Chevron cases within a much larger docket. The types of Chevron
cases a circuit court judge might see vary meaningfully from circuit to circuit.55
Justice Gorsuch participated in more than 2,700 cases while serving as a

49. Id. at 1146.
50. See, e.g., Martin v. Soc. Security Admin., 903 F.3d 1154, 1161 & nn.47–49 (11th Cir. 2018) (per
curiam) (documenting the circuit split); Neustar, Inc. v. FCC, 857 F.3d 886, 893–94 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (declaring Chevron waived by agency’s failure to advocate for it); James Durling & E. Garrett West, May Chevron Be Waived?, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 183 (2019) (discussing the issue).
51. 138 S. Ct. 2 (2017) (mem.).
52. See id. at 2–3 (Gorsuch, J., respecting the denial of certiorari).
53. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Smiley, 138 S. Ct. 2563 (2018) (mem.).
54. See id. at 2563–64 (Gorsuch, J., respecting the denial of certiorari).
55. See Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1, 49–
52 (2017).
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judge on the Tenth Circuit.56 Yet of those hundreds of cases, only eighteen
appear to have yielded published opinions that even cite Chevron or, for thoroughness, Skidmore or Mead.57 In many of those cases, the Tenth Circuit cited
Chevron only in passing, sometimes in a broader discussion of judicial deference doctrine before applying some other standard of review,58 and sometimes in cases with little or nothing to do with judicial deference at all.59 The
number of cases in which Justice Gorsuch participated while a Tenth Circuit
judge that applied or meaningfully discussed the Chevron standard is quite
small—only ten cases—and collectively is a rather unusual set.
Chevron is often most closely associated with judicial review of agency regulations that contain interpretations guided by agency expertise, often with respect to scientific or other technical subject matter, which were adopted using
notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures that emphasize public participation. Chevron itself was such a case—evaluating a notice-and-comment regulation that elaborated the meaning of the statutory term “stationary source” for
permitting purposes under the Clean Air Act.60 Many if not most Supreme
Court applications of the Chevron standard similarly have involved direct chal56. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Neil M. Gorsuch to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 66 (2017) [hereinafter
Confirmation Hearing] (statement of Hon. Neil Gorsuch).
57. Cases were identified in two ways. First, a deliberately overbroad Westlaw search was run, with
the false positives (e.g., cases containing the word “Chevron” but not referring to the standard) excluded by
reading the search results. See WESTLAW, https://1.next.westlaw.com (follow “Cases” hyperlink; then follow “U.S. Courts of Appeal” hyperlink; then follow “10th Circuit Court of Appeals” hyperlink; then enter
and apply search term adv: (Chevron Skidmore “Mead Corp.”) & Gorsuch & DA(bef 04/08/2017) & DA(aft
08/08/2006)) (yielding 33 cases). Second, also in Westlaw, a Keycite search was performed for each of the
Chevron, Skidmore, and Mead decisions, with the results then narrowed to Tenth Circuit cases that included
the word “Gorsuch” and that were decided during Justice Gorsuch’s service on that court, between August
8, 2006, and April 8, 2017, again excluding false positives by reading cases not previously identified. Cf. id.
58. See Zen Magnets, LLC v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 841 F.3d 1141 (10th Cir. 2016) (invalidating a regulation on other grounds, with then-Judge Gorsuch writing and a dissenting judge arguing for
Chevron deference given his views regarding those other grounds); El Encanto, Inc. v. Hatch Chile Co., 825
F.3d 1161, 1165 (10th Cir. 2016) (mentioning the Chevron and Auer standards in rejecting a nonspecific
claim to deference for a subregulatory manual, and authored by then-Judge Gorsuch); Miami Tribe of Okla.
v. United States, 656 F.3d 1129, 1142 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing Chevron in discussing standards of review generally before evaluating an agency’s application of its regulations in an adjudication, joined by then-Judge
Gorsuch); Thomas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 631 F.3d 1153, 1162–63 (10th Cir. 2011) (evaluating an informal
agency interpretation of a statute using the Skidmore standard, joined by then-Judge Gorsuch); S. Utah Wilderness v. Office of Surface Mining Reclamation & Enf’t, 620 F.3d 1227, 1235–36 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing
Chevron as part of a larger discussion of judicial deference standards but not applying Chevron in reviewing
the administrative order in question because it lacked the force of law, joined by then-Judge Gorsuch); see
also United States v. Magnesium Corp. of Amer., 616 F.3d 1129, 1142 n.11 (10th Cir. 2010) (not citing Chevron but mentioning the Skidmore standard in upholding an interpretative rule against procedural and process
challenges, with then-Judge Gorsuch writing).
59. See Entek GRB, LLC v. Stull Ranches, LLC, 840 F.3d 1239, 1141 (10th Cir. 2016) (resolving the
case under law of the case doctrine so mentioning but ignoring appellant’s Chevron argument); United States
v. Nicholson, 721 F.3d 1236, 1249 (10th Cir. 2013) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (addressing a Fourth Amendment issue and citing Chevron among several cases for the general proposition “that we live in a world where
some laws are ambiguous and don’t admit an easy or even a single right answer”).
60. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 839–40 (1984).
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lenges to the validity of agency regulations adopted through notice-andcomment rulemaking.61 One informal study of the Supreme Court’s Chevron
jurisprudence from 2001 through 2014 documented eleven cases of deference
to agency regulations, as compared to three of deference to adjudications,62
although recent terms arguably have seen an uptick in adjudication cases, particularly concerning interpretation of the immigration laws.63
By comparison, Justice Gorsuch’s Tenth Circuit Chevron docket reflects a
heavier concentration of agency adjudications—five of the ten, often with
agencies seemingly taking aggressive positions. The De Niz Robles, GutierrezBrizuela, and Hydro Resources cases described above fall into this category. Another is Caring Hearts Personal Home Services, Inc. v. Burwell,64 in which the Center
for Medicare and Medicaid Services persisted in pursuing reimbursement of
$800,000 in Medicare payments from a health care provider even after it became clear that the agency had applied the wrong regulations in ordering the
repayment.65 Writing for the court in that case, then-Judge Gorsuch said essentially that it was a good thing that the agency did not claim Chevron deference given that the agency was “struggling to keep up with the furious pace of
its own rulemaking.”66 The last is TransAm Trucking, Inc. v. Administrative Review
Board, which saw then-Judge Gorsuch dissenting to argue both that the statute
was clear and that the agency had failed to claim Chevron deference,67 while the
panel majority deferred under Chevron.68
By comparison, the five Chevron cases involving notice-and-comment regulations in which then-Judge Gorsuch participated at the Tenth Circuit are
much less remarkable. In Forest Guardians v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service69 and Berneike v. CitiMortgage, Inc.,70 Judge Gorsuch joined opinions written
by others deferring to agency interpretations at Chevron step two, although he
concurred separately in the former to address “two minor” (and unrelated)

61. See, e.g., Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 183 S. Ct. 2067 (2018); Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct.
2699 (2015); EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, LP, 572 U.S. 489 (2014); Astrue v. Capato, 566 U.S.
541 (2012); Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44 (2011); Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519 (2009); Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158
(2007); Global Crossing Telecomms., Inc. v. Metrophones Telecomm., Inc., 550 U.S. 45 (2007); Zuni Pub.
Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81 (2007); Household Credit Servs. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232
(2004); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002); Yellow Transp., Inc. v. Michigan, 537 U.S. 36
(2002).
62. See Hickman, supra note 16, at 548 & nn.168–70.
63. See Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018); Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562
(2017); Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980 (2015).
64. 824 F.3d 968 (10th Cir. 2016).
65. Id. at 970.
66. Id. at 969–70, 973.
67. 833 F.3d 1206, 1216 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 1211–12.
69. 611 F.3d 692 (10th Cir. 2010).
70. 708 F.3d 1141 (10th Cir. 2013).
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points.71 In a third, WWC Holding Co. v. Sopkin, he dissented from a decision
in which the majority extended Chevron deference to FCC regulations, but for
reasons wholly unrelated to that aspect of the majority’s decision. A fourth,
Contreras-Bocanegra v. Holder, saw him joining his colleagues and three other circuits in rejecting an agency regulation at Chevron step one, but without questioning that Chevron was the appropriate standard.72 And in the last, Elwell v.
Oklahoma, he authored the opinion for a unanimous panel again declining
Chevron deference because statutory meaning was clear, without questioning
the applicability of the standard.73
This dichotomy between adjudications and rulemakings arose, at least in a
sense, in his Senate confirmation hearing. In an exchange with Senator Dianne Feinstein regarding the EPA’s Corporate Average Fuel Economy
(CAFE) standards, then-Judge Gorsuch claimed he had “never suggested”
that he found Chevron deference problematic in the rulemaking context, as
contrasted with adjudications, like those in De Niz Robles and GutierrezBrizuela.74 When Senator Feinstein questioned whether he had said that “Congress could not legislate by leaving some of the rules up to the scientists or
other professionals in departments,” Gorsuch described that characterization
of his views as a “misunderstanding.”75 He then contrasted Senator Feinstein’s
example, based on “fact-finding by scientists, biologists, and chemists” who
“get great deference from the courts,”76 with the circumstances of GutierrezBrizuela, where an agency had upended “the judicial precedent that this man
had relied upon” and “overturn[ed] a judicial precedent without an act of
Congress[,] . . . raising serious due process concerns, fair notice and separation
of powers concerns.”77 “[C]an a man like Mr. Gutierrez, the least amongst us,
be able to rely on judicial precedent on the books, or can he have the ball
picked up as he is going in for the kick?”78
II. THE PERSISTENCE OF STATUTORY AMBIGUITY
As Justice Gorsuch no doubt appreciates, doing away altogether with judicial deference to agency interpretations of statutes is unlikely, for the simple
reason that the judiciary is ill-equipped to resolve at least some if not many
ambiguities in statutory text. “Ambiguity” in the context of Chevron jurisprudence is a judicial term of art. A statute is not ambiguous under Chevron step
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Forest Guardians, 611 F.3d at 719 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
678 F.3d 811, 816–18 (10th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
693 F.3d 1303, 1313 (10th Cir. 2012).
See Confirmation Hearing, supra note 56, at 86.
Id.
Id. at 87.
Id. at 86–87.
Id. at 87.
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one merely because clever lawyers can articulate at least two colorable alternative interpretations of statutory text. Otherwise, every statutory interpretation
question before a federal circuit court would go straight to Chevron step two.
On the other hand, as Justice Scalia once observed, ambiguity in the Chevron
sense does not require “absolute equipoise” between two competing alternative interpretations.79 “If nature knows of such equipoise in legal arguments,
the courts at least do not.”80
Ambiguity for Chevron purposes is as much a matter of kind as of degree,
and not all kinds of statutory ambiguity push judicial review into Chevron step
two. As Justice Scalia explained further:
An ambiguity in a statute committed to agency implementation can be attributed to either of two congressional desires: (1) Congress intended a
particular result, but was not clear about it; or (2) Congress had no particular intent on the subject, but meant to leave its resolution to the agency.
When the former is the case, what we have is genuinely a question of law,
properly to be resolved by the courts. When the latter is the case, what we
have is the conferral of discretion upon the agency, and the only question
of law presented to the courts is whether the agency has acted within the
scope of its discretion—i.e., whether its resolution of the ambiguity is reasonable.81

In other words, the question under Chevron step one is not simply whether a
statute’s meaning is unclear or difficult to determine. In such cases, judges can
apply traditional tools of statutory interpretation to ascertain statutory meaning as they have done in non-agency cases for decades. Rather, the proper inquiry at Chevron’s first step really is, as the Court has often said, whether Congress left a gap that it intended the administering agency to fill.82
In some instances, Chevron-style statutory ambiguity is obvious because
Congress explicitly calls it out. Many regulatory statutes contain provisions
that expressly authorize an administering agency to adopt regulations elaborating statutory requirements based on a short description of what Congress
wishes to accomplish.83 Congress also sometimes uses statutory terms that are
so mushy and open-ended—for example, phrases like “appropriate and necessary,”84 “reasonable, practicable, and appropriate,”85 or “in the public inter-

79. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 520.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 516.
82. See Chevron U.S.A Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984).
83. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 1502 (2012) (containing a single sentence authorizing regulations for determining the tax liabilities of affiliated corporate groups); 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (2012) (extending broad authority to adopt occupational safety or health standards).
84. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A)(b) (2012); see also Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015)
(recognizing “the capaciousness of this phrase”).
85. See 49 U.S.C. § 30111(b)(3) (2012).
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est”86—that they obviously convey policymaking discretion. Even broad statutory terms are not limitless and may still cabin agency discretion. But traditional tools of statutory interpretation are not especially helpful in narrowing
statutory meaning to the point of practical application.
Consider, for example, the interpretive question at issue in AT&T v. Iowa
Utilities Board,87 which demonstrates both of these qualities. The case concerned Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulations implementing the Telecommunications Act of 1996.88 The statute in that case required
incumbent providers of telephone services to give potential competing carriers sufficient access to their local exchange networks (including but not limited to facilities and equipment) as to facilitate market competition.89 After
providing a broad general definition of the kinds of “network element[s]”
covered by the requirement,90 the statute specifically instructed the FCC to
adopt regulations “determining what network elements should be made available”91 to competing carriers by considering “at a minimum, whether—(A)
access to such network elements as are proprietary in nature is necessary; and
(B) the failure to provide access to such network elements would impair the
ability of the telecommunications carrier seeking access to provide the services
that it seeks to offer.”92
Words like “necessary” and “impair” are intrinsically ambiguous. Necessary can mean “indispensable,”93 but it can also mean something more like
“appropriate and helpful,” depending on the context.94 Is access to a network
element to facilitate market competition necessary only if absolutely required
for functionality, or is it enough for such access to significantly improve functionality? Correspondingly, impair means to “diminish in function, ability, or
quality”95 or to “make worse.”96 But how much diminishment is enough to
justify requiring access? Such determinations are infused with policymaking
discretion, and the statute clearly anticipates that the FCC should be the decider. But the exercise of such policymaking discretion is not purely factbased, either. Traditional tools are useless beyond a certain degree of generality, but they still may be useful in establishing the outer boundaries of statutory
86. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(A)(ii) (2012).
87. 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
88. Id. at 371–78.
89. Id. at 371–73.
90. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(35) (2012).
91. Id. § 251(d)(2).
92. Id. § 251(d)(2)(A)–(B) (emphasis added).
93. Necessary, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/necessary (last visited Feb. 6,
2019).
94. See Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933).
95. Impair, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/impair (last visited
Feb. 6, 2019).
96. Id.
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authority. But policymaking in these instances is not purely fact-based, either.
Indeed, the regulations at issue in AT&T required that all network elements
be made available to competitors,97 and the Supreme Court rejected that interpretation at Chevron step two for failing to give effect to necessary and impair
as anticipating limitations on access.98 But the Court, in an opinion written by
Justice Scalia, had no difficulty recognizing nevertheless that the statute could
accommodate more than one approach—i.e., was ambiguous—and that the
choice among competing permissible alternatives was for the FCC to make.99
Even provisions using terms that are less obviously mushy and openended may be obviously ambiguous in this same way. One example comes
from the Internal Revenue Code.100 That statute imposes on individuals and
entities the obligation to pay taxes, and it dedicates hundreds of pages of statutory text to instructing taxpayers regarding how to calculate their tax liabilities and prepare and file their tax returns. Congress has determined that an affiliated group of corporations that share common ownership should file a
single income tax return and determine the corresponding income tax liability
as a single economic unit. To that end,
[t]he Secretary [of the Treasury] shall prescribe such regulations as he may
deem necessary in order that the tax liability of any affiliated group of corporations making a consolidated return and of each corporation in the
group, both during and after the period of affiliation, may be returned, determined, computed, assessed, collected, and adjusted, in such manner as
clearly to reflect the income-tax liability and the various factors necessary
for the determination of such liability . . . . In carrying out the preceding
sentence, the Secretary may prescribe rules that are different from the provisions . . . that would apply if such corporations filed separate returns.101

Those two sentences represent the totality of a provision that encompasses a
very large field, as the Federal Circuit recognized in Rite Aid Corp. v. United
States.102 The individual words and phrases within that provision have meaning
corresponding to the context of the larger statute, however, such that the
agency’s discretion is not limitless. Thus, despite the apparent breadth of discretion conferred upon the Treasury Department by that provision, taxpayers
can argue, and courts may conclude, that a particular regulation exceeds statutory authority based on that context. Indeed, the Rite Aid court invalidated a
Treasury Department regulation under Chevron step two by reading the first
sentence above as preventing the agency from adopting “a method that im97. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371–73 (1999).
98. Id. at 388–92.
99. See id. at 388.
100. See generally 26 U.S.C. §§ 1–7874 (2012).
101. Id. § 1502.
102. See Rite Aid Corp. v. United States, 255 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing “special,
myriad problems resulting from the filing of consolidated income tax returns”).
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poses a tax on income that would not otherwise be taxed” under the statutory
scheme of which the provision is a part.103
Deferring to agencies when Congress commands them to act is not
unique to Chevron. In 1936, in AT&T Corp. v. United States,104 the Supreme
Court used almost Chevron-like reasoning in evaluating the validity of regulations adopted by the FCC under the Communications Act of 1934. That statute tasked the FCC with setting the rates that telephone companies could
charge their customers. The FCC could not perform that task without collecting sufficient financial information from the telephone companies regarding
the costs that they incurred in serving their customers. Thus, the statute authorized the FCC to, “in its discretion, prescribe the forms of any and all accounts, records, and memoranda to be kept by carriers subject to [the Communications Act], including the accounts, records, and memoranda of the
movement of traffic, as well as of the receipts and expenditures of moneys.”105 AT&T challenged an FCC regulation that required telephone companies to follow a particular methodology in accounting for property acquisitions on the grounds that it went beyond “prescrib[ing] the forms” for
keeping a record of accounts. In upholding the regulation, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that traditional tools of statutory interpretation were simply inadequate to illuminate the content of the statute.106 An agency might adopt
regulations providing such content that a court concludes are an unreasonable
interpretation of the statute. One example is because the regulations contain
too many exceptions and therefore are insufficiently uniform. But the ambiguity of the statute, again, is obvious.
Congressional delegation of policymaking discretion and statutory ambiguity in the Chevron sense are not limited to provisions in which Congress expressly identifies a gap for an agency to fill. Chevron’s insight was that when
traditional tools of statutory interpretation do not lead to a clear answer as to
statutory meaning, this sort of ambiguity may represent another circumstance
in which Congress intended the agency to exercise policymaking discretion.
This conception of congressional delegation and statutory ambiguity is consistent with the longstanding judicial interpretation of general grants of rulemaking authority in statutes as giving agencies the power to adopt regulations
with the same legal force as regulations adopted pursuant to specific grants of
rulemaking power.107
103. Id.
104. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232 (1936).
105. 47 U.S.C. § 220(a)(1) (2012).
106. See Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 299 U.S. at 235–37, 247.
107. See, e.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 57 (2011) (recognizing that whether a regulation carries the force of law for Chevron purposes “does not turn on whether
Congress’s delegation of authority was general or specific” and that general authority regulations carry the
force of law).
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For several decades, regulatory statutes additionally have given agencies
broad, general authority to adopt rules and regulations as they deem “necessary”108 or “needful”109 or “efficient” to effectuate the statutes that they administer.110 Since the 1960s, agencies have pursued policy objectives by adopting regulations pursuant to such general authority.111 Many statutes contain
undefined or underdefined terms, or have provisions that interact in unanticipated ways. In such cases, agencies are not filling congressionally identified
gaps. Rather, agencies and regulated parties have discovered ambiguities
through practical application and have sought to resolve those ambiguities by
regulation. And through general authority rulemaking grants, Congress has
acknowledged by statute that there may be some instances in which it has, as
Justice Scalia suggested, “no particular intent” regarding some interpretive
questions and intends for the agency to fix such problems.112 The Chevron decision itself was such an instance, with the EPA relying on general authority to
adopt regulations for the purpose of elucidating an underdefined statutory
term in the Clean Air Act, “stationary source.”113 Applying semantic canons of
construction114 and reviewing legislative history, the Chevron Court unanimously concluded that the usual methods of statutory interpretation failed to yield a
clear answer115—hence the rationale for moving on to Chevron step two and
deferring to the agency’s interpretation.
Acknowledging the notion of implied delegations through statutory ambiguity does not require treating a statute as ambiguous merely because statutory
language at first blush seems susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation. A reviewing court should engage in at least some amount of digging
into the statutory context and history before declaring a statute ambiguous.
Hence, the Chevron opinion itself, in discussing Chevron’s first step of ascertaining statutory clarity, declares that “[t]he judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction” and calls upon reviewing courts to utilize “traditional tools of statutory construction” in evaluating congressional intent.”116
In many cases, with such effort, it becomes obvious that one of the proffered
alternatives is simply right and the other obviously wrong, in that the former
comports with the statutory scheme while the latter twists it out of coherence.
108. E.g., 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (2012).
109. E.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a) (2012).
110. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 156 (2012).
111. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 546–49 (2002) (documenting this history).
112. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
113. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 839–41 (1984).
114. See id. at 859–62 (rejecting the claim that “there is no statutory language even relevant to ascertaining the meaning of stationary source” but concluding that “parsing of general terms in the text of the
statute will [not] reveal an actual intent of Congress”).
115. See id. at 862 (finding the legislative history “unilluminating”).
116. Id. at 843 n.9.
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The many cases in which courts have decided unanimously that the meaning
of the statute was clear at Chevron step one provide examples.
Also, it is undoubtedly true that Justices or judges sometimes are a little
too quick to find ambiguity, whether because they mistake the scope of the
Chevron step one inquiry or simply do not try hard enough to evaluate statutory meaning for themselves. For example, in Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio,117 Justice Kagan, writing for a plurality of three Justices, said that because the statutory provision that gave rise to the interpretive issue before the Court seemed
internally inconsistent on its face, the statute was ambiguous, and deference
was appropriate.118 Six Justices across three opinions castigated Justice Kagan
for not trying hard enough to find statutory clarity. Chief Justice Roberts,
joined by Justice Scalia, wrote to “take a different view of what makes th[e]
provision [in question] ‘ambiguous.’”119 “Direct conflict is not ambiguity,” he
said, along with, “Chevron is not a license for an agency to repair a statute that
does not make sense.”120 Instead, he read the statutory provision in context to
find its meaning, although he then found within that meaning a separate gap
for the agency to fill.121 Justice Sotomayor, on behalf of three dissenting Justices, accused Justice Kagan of “rushing to find a conflict within the statute”
rather than employing “traditional tools of statutory construction” to resolve
the seeming inconsistency.122 “We do not lightly presume that Congress has
legislated in self-contradicting terms.”123 Justice Alito also dissented, but noted
his agreement with Chief Justice Roberts’s criticism of Justice Kagan’s approach to ambiguity.124
Nevertheless, as the above examples illustrate, suggesting that all questions of statutory meaning can be resolved using de novo review risks asking
judges to go far beyond traditional tools of statutory interpretation and intrude deeply into the policy sphere. For Chevron’s first step, then, the true difficulty lies at the margins, in ascertaining at what point statutory interpretation
ends and policymaking begins. If judges should put forth at least a little effort
to find statutory clarity in some instances, then how much effort is enough,
and how much is too much? Whether the tiebreaker is Chevron or some other

117. 573 U.S. 41 (2014).
118. Id. at 57 (describing the statutory provision at issue as “Janus-faced”).
119. Id. at 76 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
120. Id.; cf. Rite Aid Corp. v. United States, 255 F.3d 1357, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[I]n the absence of a problem created from the filing of consolidated returns, the Secretary is without authority to
change the application of other tax code provisions to a group of affiliated corporations filing a consolidated return.”).
121. Scialabba, 573 U.S. at 76–79 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
122. Id. at 87–88 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 87.
124. Id. at 79 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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doctrine, reasonable judges can and will disagree over when a statute is ambiguous.125
III. CURTAILING CHEVRON’S SCOPE
As illustrated above, some amount of statutory ambiguity and judicial deference to agencies is unavoidable, at least in a world in which Congress deliberately extends policymaking discretion to agencies. Nevertheless, some Justices and judges—including Justice Gorsuch—will more aggressively apply
traditional tools of interpretation to resolve statutory meaning at Chevron step
one, and thereby will curtail the extent of judicial deference that agencies receive. Beyond the ambiguity issue, however, Justice Gorsuch is not alone in
seeing other ways to reduce Chevron’s scope. It is well settled that not every
agency action that fills a statutory gap warrants judicial review under the Chevron standard, let alone Chevron deference. Moreover, Justice Gorsuch is absolutely correct that agency actions often raise unanswered questions regarding
whether they ought even to be eligible for Chevron deference.126
In United States v. Mead Corp. and subsequent cases, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that Chevron does not provide the appropriate evaluative standard for all agency interpretations of statutes.127 Eligibility for Chevron review—
and thus for Chevron deference—is predicated on an assumption that Congress
intended the agency, rather than the courts, to be primarily responsible for resolving statutory ambiguity. In Mead, therefore, the Court said that the Chevron
standard applies only when both Congress has delegated to the agency the
power to act with the force of law and the agency has acted with that power in
administering the statute.128 The Mead Court was a little fuzzy, however, on
precisely how one should determine whether agency action carries such legal
force.
The Court in Mead identified an agency’s use of notice-and-comment
rulemaking or formal adjudication procedures as a strong indicator that a particular interpretation carries the force of law.129 These two examples are the
most obvious candidates for Chevron deference, but for different reasons.
Agency interpretations adopted through notice-and-comment rulemaking
are the paradigmatic example of an agency exercising delegated power with
the force of law to resolve statutory ambiguity. Again, the Chevron decision it125. Cf. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998) (featuring a divided Court disagreeing over
whether a statute was sufficiently ambiguous to support applying the rule of lenity).
126. See, e.g., Merrill & Hickman, supra note 8, at 848–52 (identifying fourteen separate unresolved
questions regarding Chevron’s scope, many of which remain unresolved nearly twenty years later).
127. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001); see also King v. Burwell, 135 S.
Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015).
128. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27.
129. Id.
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self concerned notice-and-comment regulations adopted by the EPA elaborating the meaning of an underdefined statutory term, “stationary source.”130 As
outlined in Part II above, statutes frequently contain both specific and general
grants of rulemaking authority for the purpose of allowing agencies to resolve
statutory details in implementing and administering government programs.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, most of the cases in which the Supreme Court has deferred under Chevron to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes have involved notice-and-comment rulemaking.131
As a normative matter, if both statutory ambiguity and agency reasonableness are present, then defending Chevron deference for notice-andcomment regulations as a format for communicating agency legal interpretations is easy. Notice-and-comment procedures are intended and designed to
facilitate public participation in the development and extensive vetting of regulatory text.132 Regulations are typically prospective in their application, so
parties subject to their mandates have advance notice.133 The agency regulatory process may be democratically suboptimal relative to the legislative process.
But unless and until the courts stop Congress from delegating policymaking
responsibility to agencies, notice-and-comment rulemaking is the next best
alternative for ensuring democratic legitimacy in the development of legal
rules.
Formal adjudications are trickier. The Supreme Court has long included
formal adjudications within Chevron’s domain, having extended Chevron review
on a number of occasions to interpretations adopted by the National Labor
Relations Board,134 the Board of Immigration Appeals,135 and other agencies
using those procedures.136 Also, long before Chevron, in SEC v. Chenery Corp.

130. See supra notes 113–15 and accompanying text.
131. See Hickman, supra note 16, at 548 & nn.168–70 (making this point).
132. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2012) (requiring agencies to publish a written notice of proposed
rulemaking, offer interested parties the opportunity to submit comments in response, and then in conjunction with final rules, publish a “statement of basis and purpose” or preamble addressing significant comments received).
133. See, e.g, Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208–09 (1988) (rejecting retroactivity,
and thus demanding prospectivity, for most agency regulations).
134. See, e.g., ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. Nat. Labor Relations Bd., 510 U.S. 317, 324 (1994); Lechmere,
Inc. v. Nat. Labor Relations Bd., 502 U.S. 527, 536 (1992); cf. Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S.
735, 768 n.6 (1988) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting the Court’s policy of
deferring to National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) interpretations of the National Labor Relations Act);
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 574–75 (1988)
(stating that “statutory interpretation by the [NLRB] would normally be entitled to deference” under Chevron but applying the canon of constitutional avoidance in rejecting the agency’s interpretation to resolve the
case at Chevron step one).
135. See, e.g., Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 516–17 (2009); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.
Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424–25 (1999); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. 421, 445–48 (1987).
136. See, e.g., Glob. Crossing Telecomm., Inc. v. Metrophones Telecomm., Inc., 550 U.S. 45, 52, 57–
58 (2007) (applying Chevron in context of an FCC order); Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680,
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(Chenery II),137 the Supreme Court held that when Congress gives both rulemaking and adjudicatory powers to an agency it tasks with implementing and
administering a statute, the agency can choose whether to use rulemaking or
adjudication procedures when acting with legal force.138 The natural interaction between Chevron’s delegation premise and Chenery II leads logically to the
conclusion that agency interpretations advanced through formal adjudication
should be Chevron-eligible. In many cases, therefore, stare decisis demands that
courts regard agency interpretations adopted through such procedures as
Chevron-eligible.
All of that said, the nature of adjudications is such that the interpretations
that an agency adopts through such procedures tend to be narrower in their
scope and may be susceptible more often to resolution through traditional
tools of statutory construction. Consider, by way of comparison, that the
courts have elaborated the requirements of the Sherman Act using common
law methods.139 Consequently, one might anticipate that a court applying the
Chevron standard in such contexts would more readily find the meaning of the
statute clear.
Moreover, serious normative objections attach to agencies utilizing adjudication rather than rulemaking to exercise policymaking discretion. Courts
and scholars have recognized that rulemaking is superior to case-by-case adjudication as a means of illuminating the meaning of open-ended statutory terminology. For example, in National Petroleum Refiners v. Federal Trade Commission,140 the D.C. Circuit lauded rulemaking as allowing an agency to provide
advance notice of legal requirements to affected parties, in addition to permitting the agency to contemplate more thoroughly the implications of its interpretive choices.141 By contrast, as discussed in Part I, then-Judge Gorsuch
recognized in cases like De Niz Robles v. Lynch142 and Gutierrez-Brizuela v.
Lynch143 that the retroactive nature of agency decisionmaking through adjudication denies affected parties notice of the legal consequences of their actions,
particularly where agencies are acting contrary to existing judicial precedent.
And, notably, when Congress has divided statutory rulemaking and adjudication powers between two agencies, the Supreme Court has at least implicitly
recognized rulemaking’s greater claim to Chevron deference by treating inter689–91, 696–97 (1991) (applying Chevron in the context of claims adjudications under the Department of
Labor’s black lung benefits program).
137. 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
138. Id. at 202–03.
139. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 96 (2012) (describing the courts’ common law approach to interpreting the term “restraint of
trade” as used in the Sherman Act).
140. 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
141. Id. at 681–84.
142. 803 F.3d 1165, 1167 (10th Cir. 2015).
143. 834 F.3d 1142, 1143 (10th Cir. 2016).
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pretations of the agency with rulemaking power as Chevron-eligible, rather than
the agency with adjudication power, especially where the two agencies disagree.144 Hence, where stare decisis does not require the application of Chevron
in the adjudication context—for example, because the adjudication in question is not formal and the agency in question has not previously received Chevron deference for its adjudications—one might anticipate Justice Gorsuch to
argue against deferring.
The Supreme Court in Mead also said that lack of notice-and-comment
rulemaking or formal adjudication procedures is not dispositive of an interpretation’s eligibility for Chevron deference.145 Since deciding Mead, the Supreme
Court has not applied the Chevron standard to defer to an interpretation advanced in any other way.146 On a few occasions prior to deciding Mead, however, the Court did extend Chevron deference to interpretations advanced
through less formal formats.147 Such cases are the exception rather than the
rule. Nevertheless, they raise uncertainty in the lower courts regarding Chevron’s scope in the post-Mead era, and again, one might anticipate that Justice
Gorsuch would seek to resolve such questions so as to curtail Chevron’s scope.
CONCLUSION
No one should consider Justice Gorsuch to be a friend of the Chevron
doctrine. Certainly, Justice Gorsuch will continue to find cases in which he
questions an agency’s claim to Chevron deference for one reason or another.
He will push for more frequent judicial resolution of statutory meaning rather
than deference to agency interpretations of law. To the extent that Chevron
deference remains an option, he will argue for clarifying and curtailing the
scope of its applicability. In both regards, he will be continuing the efforts of
some of his fellow Justices, past and present. He may even succeed in convincing his colleagues to repudiate the Chevron standard, at least by name.
Nevertheless, given the ubiquity of congressional authorizations of agency
rulemaking power and expansive congressional reliance on agencies to make
difficult policy choices, any conception that Justice Gorsuch will be able to
altogether eliminate judicial deference to agency interpretations of law in favor
of de novo review is fanciful. Whether under the label of Chevron or otherwise,
144. Cf. Dir., Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co., 514 U.S. 122, 123, 134 (1995) (noting the division of rulemaking power to the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs and adjudication power to the Benefits Review Board); Estate of Cowart v.
Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 476–77 (1992) (favoring interpretations of the Longshore and Harbor
Workers’ Compensation Act advanced by the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs over those
adopted by the Benefits Review Board).
145. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231–32 (2001).
146. See Hickman, supra note 16, at 548 & nn.168–70 (making this point).
147. See, e.g., NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256–57,
263 (1995).
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many judges simply will not want to intrude too deeply into the policy sphere
that contemporary interpretation sometimes invades.
And it is not at all clear that Justice Gorsuch really means to try to eliminate judicial deference from our jurisprudence. At the Tenth Circuit, his Chevron cases involved more than the usual number of agency adjudications with
aggressive agency positions and retroactive effect, where deferring was uncomfortable and justifications for Chevron’s applicability were arguably weaker.
It was in those cases that his rhetoric against Chevron was most vociferous. By
comparison, assuming that the Supreme Court’s past cases predict its future
docket in this regard, Justice Gorsuch now will be called upon to resolve more
cases resembling Chevron’s paradigmatic scenario: notice-and-comment regulations adopted by agencies to fill statutory gaps left deliberately to agency expertise. He may not soften his anti-Chevron rhetoric, but he also may not always object to every instance in which the Court defers.
Nevertheless, Justice Gorsuch will have plenty of opportunities to curtail
the scope of Chevron’s applicability. He undoubtedly will push his colleagues to
utilize traditional tools of statutory interpretation to resolve statutory meaning
at Chevron step one and thereby avoid deference on a case-by-case basis. Also,
he presumably will push his colleagues to resolve open questions regarding
eligibility for Chevron review to restrict deference more categorically as well.
Perhaps merely curtailing Chevron will be enough.

